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Introduction 
 
 
Tunisia’s Legitimacy and 
Constitutional Crisis 
The Troika Has Failed 
Anna Antonakis-Nashif 
In early July 2013 it looked as if Tunisia might be about to conclude an important first 
phase in the political transition, with its constituent assembly (Assemblée Nationale 
Constituante or ANC) preparing to vote on each of the articles in the latest draft of 
the constitution. Instead, the entire process is now threatened with failure. Since the 
Egyptian public mobilised against President Mohammed Morsi, leading opposition 
forces in Tunisia have been questioning the legitimacy of the constituent process. They 
say the current draft of the constitution is unacceptable, as the ANC’s one-year mandate 
has long since expired. The assassination of opposition politician Mohamed Brahmi 
has not only caused the government, accused of being complicit in his death, to lose 
further credibility, it has also escalated the constitutional crisis. Since 25 July, 60 mem-
bers of parliament have suspended their activity in the ANC. The government’s efforts 
to remedy the situation have proved unsuccessful thus far: For now, the work of the 
ANC is suspended. 
 
The decision to elect a constituent assem-
bly following the removal from power and 
flight of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali 
in January 2011 was an important step 
towards restructuring the country’s politi-
cal system. However, the Tunisian roadmap 
put in place to achieve this was not put for-
ward by the provisional government but 
rather pushed through by the protesters 
from around the country who joined the 
Kasbah I and Kasbah II movements in Jan-
uary and February 2011 and held sit-ins to 
demand a new constitution. In March 2011 
provisional President Fouad Mebazza 
bowed to pressure and announced direct 
elections to an assembly that was to draft 
a new constitution for Tunisia within one 
year and serve as its legislative body during 
the transition phase. 
Distribution of power in the ANC 
The Islamist Ennahda party emerged as 
the clear winner in the constituent assem-
bly elections in October 2011, although it 
failed to gain an absolute majority. The 
party was therefore forced to enter into a 
coalition with two smaller, more secular 
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and social-democratic partners − the 
Congrès pour la République (CPR) and the 
Forum démocratique pour le travail et les 
libertés (FDTL, also known as Ettakatol) − 
to form an interim “troika” government. 
This allowed Ennahda to build on the 89 
of a potential 217 ANC seats. Its coalition 
partners won 29 (CPR) 20 (Ettatol, FDTL) 
seats respectively. 
By entering into a coalition, the minority 
partners have been forced to make com-
promises that many of their representatives 
view as unacceptable. This has affected the 
composition of the ANC. There have since 
been numerous reshuffles, which have 
mainly been to the detriment of the two 
smaller coalition partners. Representatives 
who have switched their political alle-
giance three times are no rarity. This seem-
ing capriciousness can be explained in 
part by disappointment with the coalition 
government. Many ANC representatives 
belonging to the two smaller coalition part-
ners have felt betrayed by their parties. They 
say they have made too many concessions 
to Ennahda and have surrendered impor-
tant political positions in order to share 
power. By July 2013, only 12 CPR and 13 
FDTL representatives remained in the ANC. 
Another reason behind the reshuffles is 
the founding of a new party: Nidaa Tounes 
entered the political arena in July 2012 
and has proved a controversial addition. 
Led by Béji Caid Essebsi, Minister of the 
Interior under President Habib Bourguiba 
and Prime Minister in the first provisional 
government of 2011, the party sees itself 
as a secular alternative to Ennahda and the 
guardian of “modern Tunisia”. It brings 
together trade union activists and Destou-
rians (members of former President Habib 
Bourguiba’s party) as well as former mem-
bers of Ben Ali’s unity party, the Rassemble-
ment Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD). 
Nidaa Tounes obtained 11 representatives, 
who, for the most part, had defected from 
the CPR and FDTL. Surveys carried out in 
July 2013 showed that if an election were to 
be held the next day, Nidaa Tounes would 
beat Ennahda, gaining 20.3 percent of the 
vote while Ennahda would gain just 13 per-
cent. 
Three major blocks formed within the 
ANC. Only the Ennahda block generally 
voted according to official party policy; it 
also made its presence felt more strongly 
than the other blocks. The second-largest 
block, commonly referred to as the “inde-
pendent block”, had 53 representatives 
and was mainly comprised of members of 
splinter parties as well as 20 independent 
politicians. Among them was Mohamed 
Brahmi, the member of the Mouvement 
du Peuple party assassinated in July 
2013. The third block, called the “democ-
ratic block”, had 36 members belonging 
to al-Massar (7), al-Jomhouri (8), Alliance 
Démocratique (10) and other smaller 
groupings (11). 
The constituent process 
In November 2011, while taking their 
oaths, ANC representatives pledged to draft 
the constitution within one year. Work on 
this constitution was divided among six 
commissions, each focusing on a different 
theme. The outcomes of their work were 
summarised and revised by a coordination 
committee. The debates and feedback 
between this committee and the commis-
sions subsequently produced four drafts 
for a new Tunisian constitution. 
Questions of identity and a 
culture of consensus 
In the debates, the significance of different 
legal sources was one of the main issues 
of contention. In particular, the question 
as to which values should guide policy in 
the future remained unresolved. This was 
closely linked to the controversy surround-
ing the relationship between religion and 
the state.  
In the ANC committee responsible for 
formulating the preamble and the basic 
principles underlying the constitution, 
Ennahda made the most concessions. The 
first draft of the constitution simply stated 
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that “moderate” Islamic values would form 
the basis of the constitution. The second 
draft added that the constitution should 
uphold the “principles of human rights”, 
but only – as detailed in Article 15 – when 
these principles are consistent with so- 
called specific aspects of the Tunisian iden-
tity. This wording has particularly alarmed 
liberals as it creates the option of curbing 
human rights to safeguard specific traits of 
Tunisian identity. 
Plenary sessions have shown that opinion 
on this issue is sharply divided between the 
different camps. While Ennahda representa-
tives regard universal human rights as “left-
wing ideology” and consider Sharia law a 
sufficient guarantee of fundamental free-
doms, representatives of the independent 
and democratic blocks view human rights 
as a vital, core part of the constitution. 
Lobna Jeribi (Ettakatol), Vice President of 
the Committee for the Preamble, called for 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
to be anchored in the preamble as one of 
the constitution’s legal bases. In the current 
draft, the principles of “universal human 
rights” are recognised without restriction − 
although they are stated as being secondary 
to “Islamic values”. This was the compro-
mise agreed on by representatives of civil 
society organisations and political parties 
during a national dialogue forum. This was 
also the conclusion reached by the legal 
experts commissioned by the coordination 
committee in their report on the second 
constitutional draft. 
This solution does not, however, resolve 
the core conflict between Islamic values 
and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Instead it mirrors the culture of 
consensus, which the troika government 
is propagating – willingly or unwillingly – 
because of the difficulty of reconciling 
the coalition partners’ differing ideological 
leanings. 
The influence of civil society 
The controversies have not been limited to 
the ANC; they have also taken place within 
society and the media. In this context, the 
internet and new social media have played 
a significant role. Web-based initiatives like 
al-Bawsala have tried to create transparency 
by documenting representatives’ voting 
behaviour online and by screening live 
debates. Representatives, too, have given 
insight into their work and triggered de-
bates via their Facebook pages and Twitter 
accounts. 
The liberal camp and well-established 
civil-society organisations like Associa-
tion Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates 
(ATFD) and Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de 
l’Homme (LTDH) have expressed concern 
that if they have to spend all their time 
defending existing rights, they will not 
be able to demand any additional ones − 
especially given the distribution of power 
in parliament and the underperformance 
of secular parties. They have therefore car-
ried the wrangling over the precise formu-
lation of the constitutional draft into the 
streets. For example, a broad alliance called 
a demonstration on 13 August 2012 when 
the first draft of the constitution described 
the role of women as “complementary” to 
men. Selma Mabrouk, a member of the ANC 
committee for rights and freedoms who left 
Ettakatol to join al-Massar, posted the con-
troversial Article 28 on her Facebook page 
even before it was officially published. This 
civil society action had an effect: in the 
second draft of the constitution the clause, 
which would have placed constraints on 
gender equality, was gone. 
Thanks to this kind of civil society inter-
vention, we can draw a positive balance on 
the existing version of the constitution, at 
least with regard to human and women’s 
rights – an opinion shared even by human 
rights’ lawyers critical of the government. 
National dialogues 
The ANC was not able to proceed with 
its work as quickly as planned, and so 
national dialogues were launched to speed 
up the process and to avoid a legitimacy 
crisis when the ANC’s mandate expired in 
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October 2012. The talks were intended to 
represent a broad spectrum of political 
and civil society actors. Two rival initiatives 
emerged, one launched by the politically 
influential trade union Union Générale 
Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) and one by 
the government. 
In October 2012 the UGTT organised 
talks to discuss what steps should be taken 
after the ANC’s mandate expired. Although 
numerous parties and associations accepted 
their invitation, Ennahda and CPR declined 
due the attendance of Nidaa Tounes, which 
they wished to boycott. In February 2013 
the assassination of opposition politician 
Chokri Belaid triggered a political crisis 
that threatened to bring the entire tran-
sition process to a halt. President Moncef 
Marzouki therefore initiated another 
national dialogue on 15 April involving all 
government and most opposition parties 
represented in the ANC, including Nidaa 
Tounes. This time around, it was parties 
from the socialist and social-democratic 
side of the political spectrum and the UGTT 
that declined to join the talks. 
It was only during the second round of 
talks initiated by the UGTT in May 2013 
that all parties and numerous representa-
tives of civil society organisations finally 
sat down at one table. Nidaa Tounes had 
already taken part in the talks initiated 
by the government, which had caused 
Ennahda to cease its stonewalling. An im-
portant outcome of the UGTT talks was a 
unanimous rejection of terrorism and all 
forms of violence. 
Specifically, a broad alliance led by 
Nidaa Tounes called for the disbanding of 
the Leagues for the Protection of the Revo-
lution (Ligues de la protection de la révolu-
tion, LPR). The LPR were established shortly 
after President Ben Ali stepped down on 14 
January 2011. They are well organised, with 
17 branches across the country. Human 
rights’ organisations and opposition parties 
have attributed numerous violent attacks 
on journalists, artists and politicians to the 
leagues and these have severely hampered 
the transition process. They also suspect 
that Ennahda is secretly behind the LPR. 
Both the party and the LPR deny any 
involvement with one another. Hamma 
Hammami, leader of the Workers’ Party 
and spokesman of the Front Populaire, an 
alliance of left-wing parties, declared that 
there could be no elections until the LPR 
had been disbanded. Ennahda party leader 
Rachid al-Ghannouchi said that the LPR 
could only be disbanded by the courts 
rather than by a political decision.  
Other themes discussed during the 
national dialogues included the then-cur-
rent draft of the constitution; the election 
law for the next parliamentary elections; 
and the role of independent institutions 
such as the proposed independent media 
commission and an independent legal 
authority for the transition period (which 
was successfully launched in July). During 
the course of the debates, representatives 
agreed to have a semi-presidential system 
in the future and that elections would take 
place six months after the composition of 
the electoral commission was announced. 
The national dialogues were intended 
to get the deadlocked constituent process 
moving again following several deadline 
extensions and serious differences of opin-
ion, and to lend the process more legiti-
macy by incorporating additional civil 
society actors. The forums were unelected, 
but they included many different groups 
and were able to reach concrete agreements 
and develop constructive proposals. How-
ever, the ANC has barely taken the forums’ 
input into account, meaning that their 
positive influence has been very limited. 
The constituent process’ 
loss of legitimacy 
The fact that Ennahda agreed to include 
freedom of opinion and thought, as well 
as religion, in Article 6 of the constitution 
was seen as an important victory for the 
opposition. However, the Tunisian judi-
ciary, which has yet to be reformed, has 
been pursuing trials against activists 
critical of the government. By contrast, 
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crimes motivated by political ideology, 
including those carried out by the LPR, 
have been treated with relative leniency. 
This discrepancy is all the more obvious 
when we compare the trials of atheist 
author Jabeur Mejri, rapper Waled 15, 
Femen activist Amina and artists’ collective 
Fanni Raghman Anni with the inadequate 
investigations into the attack on the US 
embassy in September 2012 and the assas-
sination of the popular left-wing opposition 
politician Chokri Belaid in February 2013. 
The sentences passed on the activists were 
grounded on a conservative interpretation 
of existing laws and largely ignored the 
intended freedoms written into the draft 
constitution. Many members of the oppo-
sition believe Ennahda used its influence to 
impose harsher sentences. This would seem 
to confirm their suspicions that Ennahda 
has no democratic sympathies. 
The discrepancy between declarations 
and actual practice in everyday life has 
strengthened a widespread perception that 
the constituent process is becoming further 
and further removed from the realities of 
life in Tunisia. This has led to its legitimacy 
being called into question by various sec-
tions of society. Critics have accused Ennah-
da of unnecessarily dragging out the tran-
sition process. Although it was making 
concessions in the constitution, it was still 
taking measures to Islamise society and 
state institutions, by appointing Ennahda 
sympathisers to administrative posts and 
attempting to gain greater control over the 
media. 
Many observers also have the impression 
that some representatives might be draw-
ing out the debates on the constitution to 
avoid tackling the country’s real problems. 
Ahmad Khaskhoussi, secretary general of 
the Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes 
(MDS), who left the ANC in July, gave 
weight to this accusation by saying that 
representatives were intentionally delaying 
the process in order to receive payment 
over a longer period of time. Many consider 
that the results of the constituent process 
are out of proportion with its duration and 
costs, which were conservatively estimated 
by Marsad at around €16 million. Many 
believe that the representatives are working 
inefficiently and consider the national dia-
logues to be little more than show per-
formances that have brought a lot of talk 
but no action. The increasing dissatisfac-
tion is added to by the perceptions of many 
Tunisians that the urgent issues affecting 
their everyday lives, such as job creation, 
are not being sufficiently addressed. Even 
during the national dialogue initiated by 
the trade union UGTT, other problems such 
as internal security quickly found their way 
to centre stage. 
Many Tunisians would like to finally 
put this uncertain transition period behind 
them. They are demanding a swift con-
clusion to the constituent process to pave 
the way for new elections. This would, 
among other compromises, require an end 
to the disputes over the composition of the 
electoral commission, which are already in 
their sixth month. 
Opposition boycott 
The first articles of the constitution should 
have been ratified in the ANC plenary ses-
sion on 1 July. Representatives of the demo-
cratic and independent blocks interrupted 
the General Rapporteur of the Constitution, 
Habib Khedher (Ennahda), by reading out 
a communiqué calling for a boycott of the 
current constitutional draft. The Coalition 
pour la Révision de la Constitution, which 
unites around a third of ANC representa-
tives, announced prior to the session that 
it would not vote in favour of the current 
draft. The coalition had formed in April 
2013 when the third draft was presented. 
The communiqué of 1 July called the 
legitimacy of the current constitutional 
draft into question, stating that it breached 
Article 104 of the internal rules, which 
stipulate that the work of each commission 
must be duly considered. It also stated that 
the results of the national dialogues had 
not been sufficiently taken into account. 
The opposition representatives hold Ben 
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Jaffar, ANC President, and General Rappor-
teur Khedher responsible for this “fraud”, 
and say the coordinating committee over-
stepped the limits of its authority when it 
edited the draft’s content rather than just 
its form. This accusation refers particularly 
to Article 141, which establishes Islam as 
the “religion of the state” (while Article 1 
simply states that “Tunisia’s religion is 
Islam”). The accusation that Ennahda is 
tailoring the constitution to suit its own 
wishes (“à sa mésure”) is preventing a con-
sensus. 
Demands for a boycott have become 
more insistent since the Egyptian military 
deposed President Morsi on 3 July. Nidaa 
Tounes and Front Populaire congratulated 
the Egyptian people on successfully resist-
ing their Islamist ruler, who had acted 
contrary to the values of the revolution. 
Hammami, spokesman of the Front Popu-
laire mentioned above, also called for the 
dissolution of the ANC and for elections 
to a new interim government that could 
oversee the completion of the constituent 
process. Ennahda, by contrast, took the 
side of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood party. 
Ghannouchi refused to recognise the presi-
dent put in place by the military and con-
demned the military’s intervention, calling 
it an attack on all Islamic parties. Both 
camps tried to exploit the developments in 
Egypt to consolidate support, saying that 
they were a “warning signal” for Tunisia.  
In the meantime, an organisation has 
formed in Tunisia calling itself Tamarrod 
Tunisia. This resistance movement (or 
rather movements) modelled on Egyptian 
examples is collecting signatures to 
demand the dissolution of the ANC. How-
ever, the initiatives have yet to gain much 
backing. So far, they are inadequately orga-
nised. Its operators still lack the necessary 
financial clout and personnel resources in 
the form of activists or politicians. It also 
seems that the Tunisian military, a rela-
tively weak entity in any case, has no inten-
tion of supporting demands to overthrow 
the government at this time. 
The Consensus Commission 
The government has reacted in two dif-
ferent ways to accusations from the oppo-
sition and civil society. Firstly, President 
Marzouki filed a lawsuit against those who 
had called for a boycott of the ANC and the 
government, thus – according to the text of 
the lawsuit – endangering national unity. 
The first trial of Tahar Ben Hassine, head 
of TV channel Al-Hiwar al-Tunisi and mem-
ber of Nidaa Tounes, has already started. 
Secondly, Marzouki convened a Consensus 
Commission chaired by Ben Jaffar at the be-
ginning of July. The commission is charged 
with resolving differences of opinion and 
paving the way for agreement on the con-
stitutional draft’s individual articles. It took 
two days of meetings simply to ensure that 
the commission’s 22 members were repre-
sentative. This was to ensure that all parlia-
mentary groups were represented and 
that there would be no further “surprises” 
during the plenary sessions. The draft 
constitution will have to be accepted in its 
entirety by a two-thirds majority of ANC 
members by the second ballot at the latest, 
if not, a referendum will have to be called 
to decide on adoption of the constitution. 
The articles to be debated once more 
mainly concern questions of Tunisia’s 
identity. This will include discussions on 
statements in the preamble. According to 
members of the opposition, the draft lacks 
a reference to a “Mediterranean” identity 
linking the country more closely to Europe, 
as already called for in an expert report 
of April 2013. The current draft preamble 
refers only to Arab and African identity. 
The left-wing parties are also calling for a 
greater emphasis on social issues in the text 
of the constitution. In this way, these ANC 
members are attempting to include revo-
lutionary ideas. Further points of conten-
tion include Article 141, mentioned above, 
and draft legislation on the “immunisation 
of the revolution”. If this bill is passed, lead-
ing politicians from Nidaa Tounes could be 
banned from running for office in the next 
elections because of their links to the old 
regime. The bill is strongly supported by 
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the Leagues for the Protection of the Revo-
lution. However, the dissolution of precise-
ly these leagues was discussed in the UGTT’s 
national dialogue. It has not yet been re-
alised because of Ennahda’s stance, but 
it remains a cause of controversy that 
damages the entire process. 
The assassination of 
Mohamed Brahmi 
Mohamed Brahmi, a popular independent 
politician, was assassinated on 25 July. His 
murder provoked fury and despair, and 
the tensions arising from the constitutional 
process reached unprecedented levels. 
Although the suspected assassin was quick-
ly identified, critics have said that the gov-
ernment and particularly Ennahda were at 
least partly responsible for the murder as 
well as for earlier crimes against opposition 
politicians – despite the fact that the gov-
ernment and Ennahda unanimously con-
demned the murders, which they saw as an 
attack on the transformation process. 
The protests following Brahmi’s assassi-
nation were soon concentrated in front of 
the ANC buildings. Initially, the protesters 
pursued different aims – many called for a 
new government, but they did not support 
complete dissolution of the ANC. In reac-
tion to Brahmi’s assassination and a strong 
mobilisation of civil society, 60 members 
of the ANC have suspended their activity. 
Among them were not only members of 
the independent and democratic blocks 
but also of the government party Ettakatol. 
Some of them belong to the group that 
already called for a boycott of the constitu-
tional process on 1 July. They also have the 
support of the UGTT and a growing number 
of demonstrators. 
On 29 July, Ettakatol spokesman Mo-
hamed Bennour announced that his party 
would leave the coalition if Ennahda and 
CPR failed to agree to dissolve the troika 
and replace it with a government of nation-
al unity. This indicates a future rupture in 
the coalition. However, as this is not the 
first time that Ettakatol has threatened to 
leave the government this year, it is un-
clear how seriously we should take this 
announcement. What seems more impor-
tant is that the national government 
has also increasingly been challenged in 
provinces such as Kef and Sidi Bouzid, 
where interparty alliances have set up 
regional administration committees. 
By 6 August the ever-growing protests, 
which are supported by a broad social 
alliance and are becoming increasingly 
widespread, were larger than ever before. 
In reaction, Mustapha Ben Jaffar an-
nounced that the ANC’s work would be 
suspended until opposition and govern-
ment had reached a consensus. The oppo-
sition regards this as an initial success.  
The Front de Salut National (FSN), a 
coalition created on 26 July and made up 
of Nidaa Tounes, the Front Populaire and 
other parties and civil society actors, is 
demanding the dissolution of the ANC and 
the establishment of a technocratic govern-
ment to rapidly complete the constitu-
tional process. Ennahda is strictly against 
the dissolution of the ANC and advocates 
instead the enlargement of the current 
government to a government of national 
unity. The UGTT could once again be a 
mediator between the two camps. The com-
promise it suggests is to keep the ANC in 
place but at the same time to establish a 
technocratic government.  
Outlook and recommendations 
It is unlikely that a scenario similar to 
that in Egypt will arise in Tunisia, partly 
because the Tunisian military is a compara-
tively weak force. Nevertheless, the process 
to adopt a new constitution has reached a 
deadlock, and the legitimacy of the tran-
sitional government has suffered greatly. 
Thanks to its strong civil society, Tunisia 
now has an opportunity to find its own 
way out of the legitimacy crisis.  
The announcement by Prime Minister 
Ali Laarayedh (Ennahda) that elections 
would be held on 17 December 2013 does 
not reflect the demands of opposition 
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parties, civil society, and the trade unions. 
Surprisingly, party leaders Rachid al-Ghan-
nouchi of Ennahda and Caid Essebsi of 
Nidaa Tounes had an unofficial meeting 
on 15 August in Paris to discuss possible 
solutions to the political crisis. While Nidaa 
Tounes affirmed that the other members 
of the FSN had been informed about the 
meeting, the secretive nature of the get-
together has left a bad aftertaste. A possible 
agreement between Nidaa Tounes and 
Ennahda that does not include other polit-
ical actors such as the Front Populaire har-
bours the risk of creating a new legitimacy 
problem. 
As recent endeavours have shown, 
Europeans cannot do much to mediate 
between the camps embroiled in the cur-
rent crisis. Given the lengthy and difficult 
process, Europeans should certainly not 
interfere in the debate on values. In par-
ticular, they should not undertake any 
action that might lead to a further polari-
sation of society. Instead, European politi-
cians should focus their efforts on sup-
porting economic stabilisation, not least 
so that new jobs can be created. 
In addition, European politicians should 
play a role in helping to establish a critical 
public that can expand its influence. Inde-
pendent watchdog organisations such as 
al-Bawsala and Nawaat prepare information 
on the complex and often confusing devel-
opments, thus ensuring transparency. In 
this way, they are supporting the establish-
ment of a society where there is the oppor-
tunity to discuss values, policies, and exter-
nal relations in a critical, reflected manner. 
Germany and Tunisia agreed on a secu-
rity partnership in September 2012. Ger-
man and European support on restructur-
ing the security sector should primarily 
aim to ensure Tunisian police officers feel 
obliged to uphold their citizens’ rights. 
The role of the police should be to protect 
peaceful demonstrators rather than to 
baton-charge them. In this regard, Germany 
and its European partners should also 
support demands to quickly resolve alleged 
cases of police brutality. 
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